## Lights to Port - Lights to Starboard

An Objective Forensic Analysis of the Collision Between the Stockholm and the Andrea Doria

by

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## STOCKHOLM and ANDREA DORIA JULY 1956



## Stockholm

Before


After


## Andrea Doria

## Before



After



## Some Key Events Before the Collision

| 20:00:00 | Andrea Doria heading $267^{\circ}$ at 21.8 knots in relatively dense fog. <br> Stockholm heading $090^{\circ}$ at 18.5 knots with 5 to 6 miles visibility. |
| :---: | :--- |
| $21: 40: 00$ | Capt. Calamai orders Andrea Doria's course changed from $267^{\circ}$ to <br> $261^{\circ}$ to pass 1 to 2 miles south of the Nantucket Shoals lightship. <br> Capt. Nordenson orders Stockholm's course changed from $090^{\circ}$ to <br> $087^{\circ}$ to pass within 1 to 2 miles south of the Nantucket lightship. |
| $22: 10: 00$ | Stockholm's 3/O Carstens-Johannsen orders a course change from <br> $087^{\circ}$ to $089^{\circ}$ to compensate for current drift that was setting <br> Stockholm more northward than course line laid out by Capt. <br> Nordenson. |
| $22: 20: 00$ | Andrea Doria's $2 / O$ Franchini reports Nantucket lightship 1 mile on <br> starboard beam on radar. Capt. Calamai orders a course change <br> from $261^{\circ}$ to $268^{\circ}$ to put Andrea Doria on a heading for the Ambrose <br> Channel lightship. |

## Some Key Events Before the Collision

| $22: 40: 00$ | Carstens-Johannsen orders a course change from $089^{\circ}$ to $091^{\circ}$ for <br> Stockholm to further compensate for a northerly current drift. |
| :---: | :--- |
| $22: 45: 30$ | Stockholm is picked up on Andrea Doria's radar at a distance of <br> about 17 nautical miles bearing slightly to the right of the heading <br> flasher. |
| $22: 53: 00$ | Andrea Doria is picked up on Stockholm's radar at a distance of <br> about 12 nautical miles bearing slightly to the left of the heading <br> flasher. |
| $22: 56: 00$ | Carstens-Johannsen plots Andrea Doria at 10 miles bearing $2^{\circ}$ to <br> port. In reality, Andrea Doria was close to dead ahead. |
| $23: 02: 00$ | Carstens-Johannsen plots Andrea Doria at 6 miles bearing $4^{\circ}$ to port. <br> In reality, Andrea Doria was only $2^{\circ}$ to port. |
| $23: 05: 00$ | Capt. Calamai orders a course change of "4 ${ }^{\circ}$ to the left, nothing to the <br> right" for Andrea Doria. The two ships are 3.6 miles apart when <br> Andrea Doria comes on to a heading of $264^{\circ} 30$ seconds later. |

## Approach From 17 Mile Separation Derived From Course Recorder Data and Ship Speeds



| Time | Range <br> (NMs) | Mean Heading <br> of <br> Stockholm | Mean Heading <br> of <br> Andrea Doria | Rel. Bearing <br> of Andrea Doria <br> from Stockholm | Rel. Bearing <br> of Stockholm <br> from Andrea Doria |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $22: 45: 30$ | 17.1 | $090^{\circ}$ | $268^{\circ}$ | $1^{\circ}$ port | $1^{\circ}$ stbd |
| $22: 56: 00$ | 10.0 | $090^{\circ}$ | $268^{\circ}$ | dead ahead | $1^{\circ}$ stbd |
| $23: 02: 00$ | 6.0 | $092^{\circ}$ | $268^{\circ}$ | $2^{\circ}$ port | $2^{\circ}$ stbd |
| $23: 05: 00$ | 4.0 | $088^{\circ}$ | $268^{\circ}$ | $2^{\circ}$ stbd | $2^{\circ}$ stbd |
| $23: 05: 30$ | 3.6 | $090^{\circ}$ | $264^{\circ}$ | $1^{\circ}$ stbd | $6^{\circ}$ stbd |
| $23: 11: 00$ | 0.0 | $130^{\circ}$ | $254^{\circ}$ | n/a | n/a |

## Some Key Events Before the Collision

| 23:09:00 | Carstens-Johannsen orders a 2-point starboard turn on Stockholm. <br> Distance between ships now at 1.3 nautical miles. |
| :---: | :--- |
| 23:10:00 | Stockholm completes $24^{\circ}$ turn. Lookout Johansson calls bridge to tell <br> Carstens that he sees lights about 20 degrees to port. <br> Lights of the Stockholm starting to appear to Capt. Calamai and 3/O <br> Giannini out on Andrea Doria's starboard bridge wing and to the <br> lookout out on the bow. Andrea Doria's 2/O Franchini leaves the radar <br> when hearing reports of lights being seen. The ships are now just 0.6 <br> miles apart. |
| $23: 10: 30$ | Carstens hangs up the phone and goes out onto Stockholm's port <br> bridge wing and sees Andrea Doria showing a green sidelight about to <br> cross his bow from left to right. He orders full right rudder and goes to <br> the engine telegraphs to signal full astern. Capt. Calamai sees <br> Stockholm showing a red sidelight and her forward masthead light <br> swinging out to the left of the higher aft masthead light. Calamai <br> orders hard left rudder and calls for a whistle signal be given to <br> indicate a turn to port. |
| $23: 11: 00$ | Impact! The bow of Stockholm strikes into Andrea Doria just aft of the <br> starboard bridge wing. |

## Course Recorder Outputs



> CR 278
> $\left(267^{\circ}\right.$ true $)$

## Interpretation of Data From Course Recorders

Course recorder data for Stockholm (adjustment to gyro heading $=-2.5^{\circ}$ )

Course recorder data for Andrea Doria (adjustment to gyro heading $=-11^{\circ}$ )

| time from course recorder | heading (deg) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | recorder | gyrocomp value |
| 20:00-21:40 | mean heading 092.5 | 090 |
| 21:40-22:10 | mean heading 089.5 | 087 |
| 22:10-22:40 | mean heading 091.5 | 089 |
| 22:40:30-22:50:00 | mean heading 093 | 090.5 |
| 22:50:30-23:07:30 | mean heading 092.5 | 090 |
| 23:08:00-23:09:00 | mean heading 095 | 092.5 |
| 23:09:00-23:10:00 | start right turn 095 to 107.5 | 092.5 to 105 |
| 23:10:00-23:10:30 | mean heading 119 | 116.5 |
| 23:10:30-23:11:00 | hard right turn 119 to 132 | 116.5 to 129.5 |
| 23:11:00 | impact at 132 | 129.5 |
| 23:11:00-23:11:30 | 30 sec time jump at 138 | 135.5 |
| 23:11:30-23:12:00 | very sharp right 138 to 212 | 135.5 to 209.5 |
| 23:12-23:13:30 | turning right 212 to 228 | 209.5 to 225.5 |
| 23:13:30 | 228 starts turning left | 225.5 |

Helmsman changed on Stockholm at 20:00, $21: 20$, and 22:40

| time from course recorder | heading (deg) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | recorder | gyrocomp value |
| 21:00-21:40 | mean heading 278 | 267 |
| 21:40-22:21 | mean heading 272 | 261 |
| 22:21:00-23:05:30 | mean heading 279 | 268 |
| 23:05:30-23:06:00 | start left turn 279 to 275 | 268-264 |
| 23:06:00-23:10:00 | mean heading 275 | 264 |
| 23:10:00-23:11:00 | drift left 275 to 273 | 264 to 262 |
| 23:11:00 | start left turn from 273 | 262 |
| 23:11:30* | impact at 265 | 254 |
| 23:11:30-23:12:00 | cont. left 265 to 220** | 254 to 209 |
| 23:12-23:13:30 | cont. left 220 to 160 | 209 to 149 |
| 23:13:30 | 160 starts turning right | 149 |

* Course recorder time for AD appears to be ~30 sec ahead of that on Stockholm. adjustment taken in spreadsheet data.
** Change in heading rate noted at $220^{\circ}$ on recorder graph.


## Conflicting Accounts - Radar Plot for Andrea Doria Based on Information Provided by Second and Third Officers



## Stockholm's Heading Derived From Andrea Doria's Reported Radar Readings And Known Speed Of Vessels



The Vector Triangle
E-R = course vector for "our" ship [Andrea Doria]
E-M = course vector for "them" [Stockholm]
R-M = relative motion vector
CPA = closest point of approach

## Radar Plot Analysis

Time interval $=20.25$ minutes
Andrea Doria's reported heading $=268^{\circ}$
$\mathrm{ER}=7.36$ miles
$\mathrm{EM}=6.14$ miles
RM $=13.5$ miles
Direction of relative motion $=089^{\circ}$
EM heading $($ Stockholm $)=090.6^{\circ}$
CPA $=0.84$ miles
Bearing to CPA $=359^{\circ}$
Actual mean headings of Stockholm ranged from $089^{\circ}$ to $092^{\circ}$ over relevant time interval showing wide yaw variations on her course recorder.

## Conflicting Accounts - Radar Plot for Stockholm Based on Information Provided by Third Officer



## Andrea Doria's Heading Derived From Stockholm's Reported Radar Readings And Known Speed Of Vessels



## The Vector Triangle

E-R = course vector for "our" ship [Stockholm]
E-M = course vector for "them" [Andrea Doria]
R-M = relative motion vector
CPA = closest point of approach

## Radar Plot Analysis

Time interval $=6$ minutes
Stockholm's reported heading $=091^{\circ}$
ER $=1.82$ miles
$\mathrm{EM}=2.18$ miles
RM $=4.00$ miles
Direction of relative motion $=272^{\circ}$
EM heading $\left(\right.$ Andrea Doria) $=272.8^{\circ}$
CPA $=0.52$ miles
Bearing to CPA $=002^{\circ}$
Actual mean heading of Andrea Doria was $268^{\circ}$ over relevant time interval with low yaw variations seen on her course recorder.

## Spreadsheet Analysis

## Working the Problem Backwards



Knowing the speeds and exact headings of each vessel we can reconstruct the movements of each vessel as a function of time. We can also determine the range between vessels and the relative bearings of each as seen from the other for any given time.


$$
\begin{aligned}
& X_{2}=X_{1}+\delta X \\
& Y_{2}=Y_{1}-\delta Y \\
& \theta_{1-2}=\left(\theta_{1}+\theta_{2}\right) / 2
\end{aligned}
$$

## Spreadsheet Analysis

Working the Problem Backwards From 23:00:00

| 23:04:00 | 90.5 | 268.0 | -2.10 | 0.23 | 2.53 | 0.26 | 4.64 | 0.03 | 4.64 | 0.3 | -0.8 | 1.7 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 23:04:30 | 89.5 | 268.0 | -1.95 | 0.23 | 2.35 | 0.25 | 4.30 | 0.02 | 4.30 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 1.7 |
| 23:05:00 | 88.0 | 268.0 | -1.79 | 0.24 | 2.17 | 0.25 | 3.96 | 0.01 | 3.96 | 0.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| 23:05:30 | 89.5 | 264.0 | -1.64 | 0.24 | 1.99 | 0.23 | 3.63 | -0.01 | 3.63 | -0.1 | 0.6 | 6.1 |
| 23:06:00 | 90.5 | 264.0 | -1.49 | 0.24 | 1.81 | 0.22 | 3.29 | -0.03 | 3.29 | -0.5 | 0.0 | 6.5 |
| 23:06:30 | 89.5 | 264.0 | -1.33 | 0.24 | 1.63 | 0.20 | 2.96 | -0.04 | 2.96 | -0.9 | 1.4 | 6.9 |
| 23:07:00 | 88.0 | 264.0 | -1.18 | 0.24 | 1.44 | 0.18 | 2.62 | -0.07 | 2.62 | -1.5 | 3.5 | 7.5 |
| 23:07:30 | 90.0 | 264.0 | -1.02 | 0.25 | 1.26 | 0.16 | 2.29 | -0.09 | 2.29 | -2.2 | 2.2 | 8.2 |
| 23:08:00 | 92.5 | 264.0 | -0.87 | 0.24 | 1.08 | 0.14 | 1.95 | -0.10 | 1.96 | -3.1 | 0.6 | 9.1 |
| 23:08:30 | 92.5 | 264.0 | -0.72 | 0.24 | 0.90 | 0.12 | 1.62 | -0.12 | 1.62 | -4.1 | 1.6 | 10.1 |
| 23:09:00 | 92.5 | 264.0 | -0.56 | 0.23 | 0.72 | 0.10 | 1.28 | -0.13 | 1.29 | -5.8 | 3.3 | 11.8 |
| 23:09:30 | 105.0 | 264.0 | -0.41 | 0.21 | 0.54 | 0.08 | 0.95 | -0.12 | 0.96 | -7.5 | -7.5 | 13.5 |
| 23:10:00 | 116.5 | 263.0 | -0.27 | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0.06 | 0.63 | -0.09 | 0.63 | -8.3 | -18.2 | 15.3 |
| 23:10:30 | 116.5 | 262.0 | -0.13 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 0.04 | 0.31 | -0.05 | 0.31 | -8.5 | -18.0 | 16.5 |
| 23:11:00 | 129.5 | 254.0 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | \#DIV/0! | \#DIV/0! | \#DIV/0! |
| time | course/S | course/AD | Xst | Yst | Xad | Yad | $\Delta \mathbf{X}$ | $\Delta Y$ | Range | $\Psi$ | Rel.B/ST | Rel.B/AD |

## $\mathrm{X}-\mathrm{Y}$ coordinates in nautical miles (NMs)

St = Stockholm
AD = Andrea Doria

Speed of Stockholm = 0.308 NMs/min (18.5 knots)
Speed of Andrea Doria $=0.364 \mathrm{NMs} / \mathrm{min}$ (21.8 knots)
Rel. $B=$ relative bearing (+ starboard; - port)

## Plot of Collision Sequence From 23:04:00 to 23:11:00 Derived_From Course_Recorder Data and Ship Speeds



## Conflicting Accounts - Stockholm's Story

## Andria Doria Allegedly Sighted At 1.8 to 1.9 NMs About $20^{\circ}$ Off Port Bow



| Actual Spreadsheet Data Values |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Range <br> (NMs) | Mean Heading <br> Stockholm | Mean Heading <br> Andrea Doria | Rel. Bearing of <br> Andrea Doria <br> from Stockholm |  |
| Time | 1.85 | $092.5^{\circ}$ | $264^{\circ}$ | $20^{\circ}$ port |  |

## Conflicting Accounts - Andrea Doria's Story

## Stockholm Allegedly Sighted At 1 NM About $40^{\circ}$ Off Starboard Bow



| Actual Spreadsheet Data Values |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Time | Range <br> $($ NMs) | Mean Heading <br> Andrea Doria | Mean Heading <br> Stockholm | Rel. Bearing of <br> Stockholm from <br> Andrea Doria |
| $22: 05: 00$ | 3.5 | $264^{\circ}$ | $088^{\circ}$ | $14^{\circ}$ starboard |
| $23: 08: 00$ | 1.6 | $264^{\circ}$ | $092.5^{\circ}$ | $29^{\circ}$ starboard |
| $23: 09: 00$ | 1.0 | $264^{\circ}$ | $092.5^{\circ}$ | $45^{\circ}$ starboard |

## What Should the Radar Screens Have Shown Using a Heads-Up Display?

Sector of Interest on the Radar Screen



What Andrea Doria's radar screen should have shown
What Stockholm's radar


## Collision

## Seconds Before Impact

SWHepere


Angle of entry was about $56^{\circ}$ following last minute unsuccessful evasive actions that were taken by both ships.

## Andrea Doria Cannot Launch Port-Side Lifeboats

 Due To Severe And Immediate List To StarboardSWHApre

Andrea Doria assumes $25^{\circ}$ list to
stard 15 minutes after collision

LIST VS. TIME

## - $18^{\circ}$ list to starboard in the first 3 minutes

- $25^{\circ}$ list to starboard after 15 minutes
- List doubles to $50^{\circ}$ in the next 10 hours.

Plot by Capt. Charles Weeks, Maine Maritime Academy


## External Dynamics of the Collision

Ship A = Stockholm
Ship B = Andrea Doria
Direction of axis $\mathrm{X}=130^{\circ}$ true
Direction of axis $1=254^{\circ}$ true
$\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{A}}=525 \mathrm{ft}$
$\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{B}}=697 \mathrm{ft}$
$B=90 \mathrm{ft}$
$\mathrm{d}=\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{B}} / 6=116 \mathrm{ft}$
$\alpha=124^{\circ}$
$\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{B}} / \mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{A}}=\mathbf{2 . 4}$
$\mathrm{W}_{\mathrm{B}}=26400$ tons

$M_{B}=1.8 \times 10^{6}$ Slugs

## Results of External Dynamic Analysis -1

## Kinetic energy of ships before impact

Stockholm $=164,000 \mathrm{ft}$-tons
Andrea Doria $=549,000 \mathrm{ft}$-tons
Total combined energy of both ships $=713,000 \mathrm{ft}$-tons

## Impact impulses

In longitudinal direction of Andrea Doria $\quad I_{\eta}=-9,650$ ton-seconds
In lateral direction of Andrea Doria
$I_{\xi}=+10,000$ ton-seconds

## Energy released during crushing of ship structures

In longitudinal direction of Andrea Doria

$$
\begin{aligned}
& E_{\eta}=264,000 \text { ft-tons } \\
& E_{\xi}=129,000 \text { ft-tons }
\end{aligned}
$$

In lateral direction of Andrea Doria
Total combined energy loss during collision $=393,000 \mathrm{ft}$-tons or $55 \%$ of total combined kinetic energy before collision

## Results of External Dynamic Analysis - 2

Velocities of ships before and immediately after impact
Stockholm $\left(\mathrm{V}_{\mathrm{A}}\right)=+31.2 \mathrm{ft} / \mathrm{sec}$ immediately before impact $=+18.5$ knots
Stockholm $\left(\mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{A}}\right)=-8.6 \mathrm{ft} /$ sec immediately after impact $=-5.1$ knots

Andrea Doria $\left(\mathrm{V}_{\mathrm{B}}\right)=+36.9 \mathrm{ft} / \mathrm{sec}$ immediately before impact $=+21.8$ knots
Andrea Doria $\left(\mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{B}}\right)=+26.4 \mathrm{ft} / \mathrm{sec}$ immediately after impact $=+15.6$ knots

Additional imparted rotations immediately after impact
Stockholm $\left(\omega_{\mathrm{A}}\right)=4.7^{\circ} / \mathrm{sec}$ to starboard
Andrea Doria $\left(\omega_{\mathrm{B}}\right)=1.4 \% \mathrm{sec}$ to port

# Initial Movement at the Point of Impact Immediately After Impact 



## Detailed Movements Before and After Collision

(From 23:10:30.0 To 23:11:30.0)


## Detailed Collision Sequence Animation



## A FEW "WHAT IF?" SCENARIOS

In the sequence of slides that follow, ship positions are shown in 30 second increments from 23:04 to 23:11 derived from course recorder data. Stockholm is coming from the left; Andrea Doria is coming from the right.









## WHY DID IT HAPPEN?

1. The choice of using an eastbound route putting Stockholm directly into the path of westbound shipping heading to New York just to save a little time and distance.
2. The failure of the Stockholm's Third Officer to call his captain or suspect fog when he could not see the lights of the fast approaching ship as it came under 6 miles almost dead ahead on his radar.
3. Dependence on an inattentive helmsman to keep a steady course and provide accurate heading reports while the third officer was trying to plot the radar picture on Stockholm. This may also have distracted the Third Officer from concentrating on the approaching vessel once it appeared on the radar.
4. The failure of those on the bridge of Andrea Doria to plot the radar picture as the situation developed, and the lack of special training by those manning the radar.
5. A possible breakdown in bridge team management on the Andrea Doria as the Second Officer left the radar upon hearing that lights were becoming visible. Also loss of situation awareness by the OOW of Stockholm caused by a phone call distraction during critical moments.

## CONCLUSIONS

## WHY DID IT HAPPEN?

6. Failure of Andrea Doria's Capt. Calamai to clearly signal his intentions to pass starboard-to-starboard by initiating a significant course change to port early enough for it to be seen on Stockholm's radar. Turning a mere $4^{\circ}$ to port at a distance of just under 4 miles would not be noticed. Capt. Calamai also failed to imagine that the unseen approaching vessel would try to pass port-to-port as required by the rules of the road for two ships approaching each other nearly head on under visual conditions.
7. Failure of the Stockholm's Third Officer to signal his intentions for a port-toport passing by initiating his 2-point turn to starboard early enough for it to be seen on the Andrea Doria's radar.

Those responsible on the bridge of each ship placed a great deal of dependence on what was seen on their respective radars, and how they interpreted the data. They both failed to appreciate the limitations of using radar by not allowing enough time or distance for sudden actions to be taken by the approaching target vessel. When decisive actions were finally taken, it was too little and too late.

