If Birma was 22 miles away when Californian was 15 miles away from the CDQ site at 6:12am Birma time, then at 6:30am, about the time when Californian would have cleared the pack ice, Birma should have closed the distance remaining to the CQD site to about 18 miles, while Californian would have had about 14 miles to go. When Californian was asking Birma if they could see a 4 -masted steamer with a pink funnel at 7:17am Birma time, Birma should have been only 7 miles from the CQD site, while Californian should have been just a little over 3 miles from the site if she had headed directly for the distress coordinates. One must also keep in mind that Mount Temple and Californian were reported to be very close to each other only 10 minutes earlier according to Mount Temple's wireless operator John Durrant. The straight line distance between Birma and Californian at 7:17am Birma time should have been about 10 miles, well within easy sight of each other as can be seen in the diagram in Figure 15-05 which maps out these movements under the assumptions stated.


Fig. 15-05. Reported movements of Birma and Californian 6am to 7:17am.
But neither ship sighted the other, nor was Birma sighted at that time by Mount Temple which was then relatively close to where Californian was. It would have been about the same time that Birma's wireless log reported sighting a group of icebergs ahead, and sent a warning to ships coming up from behind them. ${ }^{20}$

At 7:17am Birma time, Californian was actually running down along the western edge of the icefield heading about SSE true toward a point opposite to where Carpathia was located. About 30 minutes later, 7:47am Birma time, Mount Temple had reported that both Californian and Carpathia were in sight, ${ }^{21}$ and about 8 am Californian was sighted from Carpathia about 5 to 6 miles off bearing WSW true steaming directly across the pack ice straight toward Carpathia. ${ }^{22}$

The next piece of valuable evidence comes from a statement by Mount Temple's Captain James Henry Moore before the American Inquiry when he was asked when it was that Birma came in sight.

Mr. MOORE. About 8 o'clock we sighted the Birma.
Senator SMITH. How far away?
Mr. MOORE. We could just see smoke when we first sighted her. We just saw the smoke, and then we saw the yellow mast and yellow funnel. I thought it might possibly be the Olympic, and we steered toward her. Shortly after she was coming up very fast and we saw she had only one mast - that is, one funnel, rather.

Mount Temple's clocks were 1 hour 46 minutes ahead of those in New York, ${ }^{23}$ within 1 minute of Birma's. Captain Moore's reported sighting time of 8 o'clock, when Birma was first seen coming up over the horizon, is about an hour later than what was put down as an ETA in Birma's wireless log. So where was Birma between 7 and 8am?

Our next source comes from an Associated Press news report that appeared on page 2 of the Chicago Daily News, Tuesday, April 23, 1912. The report said:

Captain Stolpin [sic] said his vessel was 100 miles from the Titanic when he received the wireless call that the liner was in danger. The Birma hurried toward the spot, but had to take a roundabout course owing to the presence of enormous icebergs. As the Birma reached the scene of the disaster the Cunard liner Carpathia telegraphed that the Titanic's boats had been picked up, but that the liner had sunk.

The Birma received the first call for help from the Titanic at 12:32 Monday morning. Captain Stolpin [sic] immediately proceeded at full speed in the direction indicated, meanwhile preparing his boats for rescue work, but when at 8 o'clock the Birma reached the scene she found nothing but icebergs. At the other end of an immense icefield she sighted a vessel, which turned out to be the Carpathia. The Birma was in wireless touch with the Titanic from 12:32 until 2 o'clock.

What is interesting about this report, which was taken down when Birma arrived in Maasluis, Holland on April 23, are the times that were given by Captain Stulping. The difference between 12:32am and 8:00am is just about $7 \frac{1}{2}$ hours. The distance from the CQD location to $40^{\circ} 48^{\prime} \mathrm{N}, 52^{\circ} 13^{\prime} \mathrm{W}$, the DR location for Birma at midnight, is 107 miles, a distance that would be covered in that amount of time if the ship managed to get up to 14.3 knots.

In an article written by San Francisco journalist and Birma passenger Charles E. Walters on April 22, 1912 for The Daily Telegraph, a speed of $141 / 2$ knots was mentioned as the speed that Birma was making during her mad dash to the rescue. The article was signed by Captain Stulping, First Officer Alfred Neison, Purser G. Hesselberg, and the two wireless operators, Joseph Cannon and Thomas Ward. ${ }^{24}$

A time of 12:32am Monday morning would have been a couple of minutes after Birma's clocks would have been set ahead by 30 minutes. It would have corresponded to $10: 45 \mathrm{pm}$ NYT. So if we accept a departure time of $12: 32 \mathrm{am}$ ATS, just 2 minutes past the midnight change of watch and clock advancement time, and use a speed of 14.5 knots from that point forward, we find that it would take 7 hour and 19 minutes to cover the remaining 106 miles to the CQD location. The ETA works out to 7:51am Birma ATS, consistent with an arrival time of about 8 o'clock in the morning that was attributed to Captain Stulping in the Associated Press report. Furthermore, we have seen that smoke from Birma's yellow funnel was sighted coming over the horizon about that time from Mount Temple who kept to the western side of the icefield from Carpathia while the latter was busy picking up

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